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Abstract 
This Paper is a case study of the development and execution of the End-of-Mission plans for 
the Earth Radiation Budget Satellite (ERBS) and the Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite 
(UARS). The goals of the End-of-Mission Plans are to minimize the time the spacecraft 
remains on orbit and to minimize the risk of creating orbital debris. Both of these Missions 
predate the NASA Management Instructions (NMI) that directs missions to provide for safe 
mission termination. Each spacecrafts had their own unique challenges, which required 
assessing End-of-Mission requirements versus spacecraft limitations. Ultimately the End-of- 
Mission operations were about risk mitigation. This paper will describe the operational 
challenges and the lessons learned executing these End-of-Mission Plans 
I. Introduction 
The End-of-Mission operations for ERBS and UARS began after NASA Headquarters directed the Earth Science 
Mission Operations (ESMO) Project to terminate the ERBS and UARS operations [I]. In the case of ERBS 
decommissioning was to be accomplished by the end of September 2005. UARS was to be decommissioned by the 
end of January 2006 [2]. These two missions were some of NASA's oldest operational spacecraft. Both had operated 
over extended lifetimes, successfully producing very valuable science data for 20 and 14 years respectively. The 
ERBS and UARS spacecraft had both suffered multiple component failures. In light of the degraded systems, 
performing the End-of-Mission Activities offered many technical challenges. The Flight Operations Team After 
struggling to keep these spacecraft operational for years now found themselves in another unique phase of the 
mission. 
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The End-of-Mission goal was to passivate the spacecraft by depleting all the remaining fuel, ensuring the batteries 
do not overcharge and possible explode, and by eliminating any onboard energy sources that may present the risk of 
creating orbital debris. This part of the mission was not designed into the spacecrafts. Performing these operations 
requires carehl planning and coordination. Performing orbit-lowering maneuvers required a well thought out 
maneuver strategy to ensure that all goals could be safely met. Collision avoidance screenings were required to 
ensure that these maneuvers did not jeopardize other missions. In the UARS case the predicted final maneuvers 
would leave the spacecraft with a perigee at the same altitude of the International Space Stations (ISS) orbit. Other 
technical considerations included accounting for the changing performance and characteristics of the propulsion 
system. As in the case of ERBS, having depleted most of the fuel aboard, the performance of the propulsion system 
suddenly changed radically and unpredictably. This unpredictability caused an anomaly during the last monthly 
yaw maneuver. Even though the system characteristic had been modeled to account for the degraded performance, 
the behavior at the start of the maneuver was greatly different than seen previously. 
Many unique mission elements were dealt with during End-of-Mission Operations; much of the system knowledge 
had been lost due to the age of the missions. The Cadre of Engineers that was required to draw on the diminished 
resources that were still available. This was another significant challenge in performing all decommissioning 
activities successfully. 
11. ERBS 
The Earth Radiation Budget Satellite (ERBS) was deployed from the Space Shuttle Challenger during Shuttle 
Mission STS-41G on October 5, 1984. ERBS had a scheduled mission life of 2 years. The ERBS was launched into 
a 61 1km orbit with a 57' inclination circular orbit. ERBS has continued to operate and provide valuable science for 
over 21 years. The observatory provided data to form an earth radiation budget, which describes the thermal 
equilibrium that exists between the Sun, the Earth and space. ERBS carries two payloads, the Earth Radiation 
Budget Experiment (ERBE) and the Stratospheric Aerosol and Gas Experiment I1 (SAGE 11). ERBE, in turn, 
comprises two instruments, the ERBE-Scanner (ERBE-S) and the ERBE-Non-Scanner (ERBE-NS). The ERBE 
instruments measure total solar irradiance, reflected solar radiation and EartWatmosphere radiation. Absorbed solar 
radiation is calculated from these measurements. SAGE-I1 monitors the radiation energy of the atmosphere by 
determining the amount and global distribution of stratospheric aerosols, constituents such as nitrogen dioxide and 
ozone, and the natural background formed by ambient constituents [3] 
This Spacecraft was developed and launched prior to the NASA directives which required spacecraft to have the 
ability to safely terminate their mission with controlled reentry. From its final orbit it will be allowed to return 
uncontrolled to the earth in approximately 17 years. The NASA guidelines preferred method calls for missions to 
lower their orbit perigee as much as possible, both to minimize the on-orbit lifetime, as well as to deplete all 
onboard hydrazine fuel. The initial study for ERBS indicates however, that the risks associated with eliminating the 
remaining fuel by performing post-science mission delta-V maneuvers were very significant, and therefore those 
maneuvers were not performed. With the exception of orbit lowering, the baseline plan strives to achieve all other 
NASA mission termination objectives. 
After performing 2 300-minutes Fuel 
Depletion Bums the final Bum was 
conducted in 2,4 8 and 10 minute 
increments to ensure that the 
Spacecraft remained stable. Having 
spent almost 24 hours trying to deplete 
the last of the remaining fuel, the 
ERBS End-of-Mission Team decided 
that the time had come to terminate the 
Mission. Starting at 21022 14 October 
2005 the passivation of the spacecraft 
began. ERBE and SAGE were 
powered back on and all available 
power loads were enabled. During the 
14 October 2005 21462 support the 
final tape recorder playback was 
performed. On board memory was scrubbed and all commandable solar array circuits were taken off-line. 
On the final ERBS contact, TDW 22082, the attitude and momentum control system was disabled and the power 
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system was put in discharge. The final commands opened the thrusters to allow the remaining fuel to seep out and 
the transponders were powered off for the last time at 23:00:00 
ERBS completed 114941 orbits over 21 years of operations. Though, time had taken its toll the spacecraft refused 
to go quietly. 
111. ERBS Status and Disposal Assessment 
The status of the ERBS spacecraft bus limited the options available to the ERBS Flight Operation Team for 
decommissioning. Since component failures had occurred over the spacecraft's 21-year life, the ability of the 
spacecraft to satisfactorily complete orbit lowering maneuvers was given a low probability of success. It would have 
required 90+ Perigee-lowering maneuvers to deplete the remaining fuel. To perform these maneuvers the spacecraft 
would need to Pitch over 90" without a viable Attitude Control System. Based on an assessment of all the potential 
disposal options, the only viable option is decommissioning ERBS on orbit. 
The GSFC Flight Dynamics (FD) organization had performed extensive analysis to determine the final orbit and 
attitude based on approximately 1751bs of fuel currently remaining on-board ERBS. The following table provides 
an estimate of the fuel consumption during the planned ERBS decommissioning thruster bums: 
I Burn Sequence I Duration 1 Orbit Impact ] Fuel Consumption I 
~ o t a l  1 920min [ -15km 1 > 175 1bs I 
Several analyses of ERBS reentry were performed by GSFC to determine the Debris Casualty Area (DCA). Results 
Test Burn 
Confidence Bum 
Long Duration Bum 
Final Ventine 
of these analyses are summarized as follows: 
Probability Likelihood of 
of Casual 
0.000396 1 in 2525 
0.000516 1 in 1937 
40.3 0.00062 1 1 in 1610 
20min 
300 min 
300 min 
3OOmin 
IV. ERBS Observatory Status 
The ERBS was launched into a 61 lkrn altitude 57"- inclination circular orbit. Designed for a 2-year life, ERBS was 
continuously operated and provided very significant valuable science for over 21 years. The observatory provides 
data to form an earth radiation budget, which describes the thermal equilibrium that exists between the Sun, the 
Earth and space. ERBS carries two payloads, the Earth Radiation Budget Experiment (ERBE) and the Stratospheric 
Aerosol and Gas Experiment I1 (SAGE 11). ERBE, in turn, comprises two instruments, the ERBE-Scanner (ERBE- 
S) and the ERBE-Non-Scanner (ERBE-NS). The ERBE instruments measure total solar irradiance, reflected solar 
radiation and Earthlatrnosphere radiation. Absorbed solar radiation is calculated from these measurements. SAGE- 
I1 monitors the radiation energy of the atmosphere by determining the amount and global distribution of 
stratospheric aerosols, constituents such as nitrogen dioxide and ozone, and the natural background formed by 
ambient constituents. 
A summary of the ERBS mission status, as well as the status of the instruments and spacecraft bus systems is 
provided in the following section. 
- 10km 
-3 krn 
> I km 
< l k m  
A. Mission Status: 
E M S ,  as of October 2005, had completed all Science Mission and extended Mission objectives 
5 1b 
65 lb 
651b 
>60 lb 
B. Payload Status at Start of Decommissioning: 
1. ERBE-S 
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The ERBE scanner failed on February 28, 1990. It was determined at that time that the elevation beam motor had 
stopped and the beam was not scanning. After several recovery attempts, the instrument has been powered OFF 
since March 199 1. 
2. ERBE-NS 
ERBE non-scanner continued to operate nominally. The instrument could not be elevated to perform bi-weekly 
internal and Solar-calibrations. However, there were no trends or indications of any other problems. 
3. SAGE II 
The SAGE I1 instrument experienced a failure in July of 2000. SAGE I1 was unable to lock on to either sunrise or 
sunset events. This was believed to be due to excessively noisy azimuth potentiometer readings in selected azimuth 
regions. An operational work-around had been developed which allows SAGE I1 to collect approximately 50 
percent of the nominal science data. 
ERBE-NS was powered-off 22 August 2006 in preparation of decommissioning activities. SAGE I1 was powered 
off at the completion of their August 2006 Monthly Scan Cycle. 
C. Subsystem Status at Start of Decommissioning: 
ERBS was designed and built with considerable redundancy throughout all of its subsystems; however, the 
spacecraft continued to operate afkr permanent fail-over to several redundant components. The following subsystem 
summaries describe the status of each with respect to its ability to support the science mission and to support the 
End-of-Mission plan. 
1. Electrical Power System (EPS) 
ERBS was launched with two - 50 ampere-hour Nickel Cadmium batteries, each containing 22 cells. Battery #2 has 
experienced 5 cell failures and has been disconnected from the main bus as of January 1999. Battery #1 has 
experienced failures in 3 cells (the last occurring in March of 2000) leaving 19 cells producing a bus voltage of 23V. 
Due to the cell failures, battery charging is accomplished via ground commands uplinked at least twice per day. The 
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power system continues to support the science mission in its current state. 
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Figure 1; ERBS Spacecraft 
Power Management 
Power Management required controlling the Battery charge rate. This was accomplished via ground command 
loads which were uplinked at least twice per day. Three Constant Current Modes from the SPRU were used to 
charge the battery. The battery was charged at the beginning of day at 2.7 Amps. The middle of the orbit day, the 
battery is charged at 11.4 Amps, and then back to 2.7 Amps at the end of the orbit day. A 5-Amp discharge rate is 
used during full sun periods and during shallow discharge periods to minimize battery overcharge. The time in each 
constant current mode is monitored every orbit to maintain a ChargeDischarge (CD) ratio of 1.01. 
Due to the number of cells, the minimum bus voltage ranged from 21.3 - 24.0 volts. The minimum bus voltage 
averages was normally above 23.0 volts. The spacecraft would lose all communications if the bus dropped below 
approximately 20 Volts. A cell failure would drop the average bus voltage by approximately 1.2 volts to 21.8 volts. 
2 Attitude Control and Determination System (AC&DS) 
The ACDS was comprised of the Magnetic Control System (MCS) and the Reaction Control System ( R C S ) .  The 
MCS maintained attitude control during day-to-day operations, while the RCS was used to support the monthly yaw 
maneuvers. (As a single array spacecraft in a non-sun synchronous attitude, the yaw maneuvers were required to 
maintain the sun on the array side of the spacecraft.) 
The ACDS system maintained hlly functioning Momentum Control System (MCS) components. The system also 
provided a B-dot mode, which was available for emergency earth re-acquisitions resulting from loss of attitude 
control which would lead to subsequent power problems. This B-dot mode was activated during the following three 
periods: July 1987, January 1999, November 2000 and December 2003. B-dot was also exercised during the Yaw 
anomaly which occurred during decommissioning activities. In each case, the reacquisition mode performed 
nominally. 
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Reaction Control System (RCS) 
For support of RCS functions, the ACDS had only 1 healthy gyro out of the original 6, and 8 of 8 thrusters were 
operating nominally at the start of decommissioning activities Thruster performance degraded which resulted in 
thruster imbalance and unstable performance which will be discussed further in the Yaw anomaly section. In order 
to extend the gyro lifetime, the unit is powered on only for the period immediately preceding the maneuver until 
maneuver completion. 
With respect to supporting orbit adjust maneuvers; the availability of only 1 gyro precluded the RCS from providing 
adequate attitude for long AV bums. Should the remaining gyro fail during a AV maneuver, it is likely that yaw axis 
control would be lost. Loss of attitude control would eventually propagate into power failures and on to loss of 
communications. The RCS supported the monthly yaw maneuvers, although the gyro failures caused modifications 
to the yaw maneuver command sequence procedures. At the time, a Z-axis gyro-only maneuver procedure was 
being utilized. It should be noted that these maneuver procedures were highly dependent upon the state of the 
power subsystem. As such, the yaw maneuver procedures had been designed in such a manner to account for the 
number of remaining cells in the functioning battery. B-DOT mode was disabled during normal operation due to 
power concerns. 
Orbit Adjust Propulsion System (OAPS) 
The OAPS, which comprises the propulsion components to perform AV burns, was fully operational. In 2002 The 
ERBS Mission was being assessed and a change in mission orbit was required. Operations were conducted to lower 
its orbit to approximately 500km Circular orbit. While the ERBS orbit is no longer routinely maintained, the OAPS 
was used to lower the spacecraft to the calibration orbit. 
3. Communications and Data Handling (C&DH) 
The C&DH subsystem supported on-board command processing and telemetry handling, science and housekeeping 
data storage, as well as the ability to receive and transmit these commands and data. The C&DH system was 
comprised of two fully redundant and partially cross-strapped strings to support the command and telemetry 
functions. Four data recorders were available for data storage. The spacecraft had three RF antennas; all three 
antennas remained healthy. Nominal command and telemetry functions were performed through the ESSA 
(gimbaled antenna). Two omni antennas (one nadir looking, the other zenith looking) were available for 
contingency operations. 
Commanding 
The C&DH subsystem remained single fault tolerant for real-time commanding as both command strings remained 
functional. There were two healthy transponder receivers and each receiver could get a command from any one of 
the 3 antennas. A failure to any component in the real-time command line with the exception of Transponder-A, 
would of left the spacecraft one failure away from loss of real-time commanding. Being zero-fault tolerant for real- 
time commanding constituted a trigger point for the Orderly Mission Termination Procedure. With respect to stored 
command capability, the need to upload battery charge commands twice per day (see EPS discussion above) made 
this capability essential for continued spacecraft operations. (The power management commands are only available 
for 12 hours after the last CSM load was uplinked.) Only one healthy Command Storage Module (CSM) exists. 
This CSM can be accessed by Transponder A only thereby made a failure to Transponder-A receiver a trigger for 
the Emergency Mission Termination Procedure. 
Telemetry 
The spacecraft was zero-fault tolerant for telemetry as the loss of the second Digital Telemetry Unit (DTU) or loss 
of the Telemetry Distribution Unit (TDU) would leave the spacecraft without telemetry capability. Loss of 
telemetry capability was a trigger for execution of the Emergency Mission Termination Procedure. Other telemetry 
support components including the transmitters and power amplifier remain single fault tolerant. The loss of the 
ESSA antenna would result in loss of science data. Housekeeping data would be preserved via the omni antennas to 
the available ground stations or TDRSS. 
Data Storage 
All four tape recorders were functioning. ERBS only required that one tape recorder function to capture all SAGE I1 
data and part of the housekeeping data. 
4. Thermal Control System (TCS) 
The TCS comprises a combination of Multi-Layer Insulation (MLI), heaters, louvers and thermal control finishes. 
The TCS was fully functional. 
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V. Applicability of NASA Guidelines and Policies to ERBS 
ERBS was launched in 1984, prior to NASA's establishment of an orbital debris policy (NSS-1740.14 "Guidelines 
and Assessment Procedure for Limiting Orbital Debris", dated August 1995). The applicability to ERBS of current 
NASA End-of-Mission Disposal policies (NPD 8710.3B "NASA Policy for Limiting Orbital Debris Generation", 
dated April 2004) [4] is limited to defining operations that minimize the ERBS lifetime and minimize ERBS as an 
on-orbit or reentering debris hazard. 
The ERBSESMO project complied with the policies and guidelines by: 
1. Minimizing the potential for generation of orbital debris due to explosion or collision via venting remaining on- 
board hydrazine. 
2. Removing the ability of the spacecraft to act as an RF source by disabling, to the extent possible, the S-Band 
receivers and transmitters. 
3. Passivating of the Observatory by disabling actuator control functions and by disablingsevering solar power 
distribution functions to the extent possible. 
VI. ERBS Decommissioning Method 
ERBS was decommissioned on-orbit by the end of Fiscal Year 2005, as directed by NASA Headquarters with 
concurrence of the Science Project Office at Langley Research Center. Following NASA guidelines and 
requirements, fuel was vented from the propellant tank, the spacecraft batteries were disconnected from the solar 
array and the transponders will be powered off. In order to confirm the ability to maintain a controlled and stable 
attitude, the plan was to enable all 4 yaw thrusters in a series of calibration tests. Once the End-of-Mission team was 
confident of the performance of the spacecraft in this configuration, venting operations proceeded. After the second 
Depletion Bum, spacecraft attitude stability became an issue. Another series of calibration bums were performed. 
The results of these calibration resulted in a change in the way the final bum was performed, as will be described 
later. ERBS fuel load had been determined to be approximately 175 pounds * 221bs. The final emptying of the fuel 
tanks indicated that a failure of the tank bladder had occurred and that the thrusters continue to perform past the 
expected depletion pressure of 80psi. 
Implementation of the ERBS End-of-Mission plan required development of an End-of-Mission Plan [4] with a 
timeline for each of the scenarios anticipated. Most of the procedures involve Instrument tum- off, "maneuver 
activities", transponder turn-off, and are performed as part of special or normal operations and are well understood 
and tested. 
Ball Aerospace Division (BASD), the spacecraft contractor for ERBS, GSFC Applied Engineering and Technology 
Directorate (AETD) Engineers and Flight Dynamic personnel, developed simulated venting models to establish the 
best configuration for venting operations 
VII. Implementing ERBS End-of-Mission Plan 
Termination of the ERBS mission was the task of the ESMO project and executed by the ERBS End-of-Mission 
team. To ensure that the Plan was implemented according to NASA guidelines and directives, a Code 300 Peer 
Review was held. Collision avoidance analysis and conjunction assessment were performed for all maneuver 
activities, which were screened by Cheyenne Mountain Operation Center (CMOC) 
The ERBS EOM Activities were planned out based on Tracking Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) and the Deep 
Space Network (DSN) forecasts. It was desired that DSN Canberra supports were scheduled during the spacecraft 
eclipse to assess the health and performance of the spacecraft during the venting operations. This was done during 
the full orbit bums with limited success. The Telemetry and Command (TAC) Front-end Processor had only been 
configured for nominal GN supports at 8Kbps. Since the Burns were being performed using the ornni antenna at a 
lower data rate, 1.4Kbps, the TAC could not completely support these events. There were no TAC Software 
engineers available to update the configuration for these events. The Canberra events experienced intermittent 
telemetry with many dropouts on the Prime TAC. The Backup TAC was completely unable to lock up on telemetry. 
The TDRSS supports for the venting operations were scheduled as critical supports. The planned End-of-Mission 
activities were executed as follows: 
Demonstration Bum 08 September 2005 11:20 - 11:40 
Confidence Burn 13 September 2005-09-13 11:30 - 16:30 
Depletion Burn 1 16 September 11:30 - 16:30 
Yaw Maneuver 23 September 
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Thruster A &C Cal 03 October 
4 Thruster Cal Bum 05 October 
10 rnin Cal burn 07 .October 
Depletion Burn 2 (Day 1) 13 October 11:OO - 23:30 
Depletion Bum 2 (Day 2) 14 October 11:OO - 22:30 
Spacecraft Passivation 14 October 23:OO 
Heartbeat Supports 15-17 October 
The overall Mission Termination Timeline was as follows: 
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Mission Termination Tie l ine  
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VIII. ERBS Burn Plan Summary 
After many discussions on the status of ERBS and how to best decommission the satellite, it was decided to leave 
ERBS in its current attitude and use the four orbit adjust thrusters (A,B,C,D) located on the top of the spacecraft to 
vent all the fuel in the tanks. As a result, the component of the delta-V using those thrusters would be in the radial 
direction causing the least amount of orbital disturbance [5]. 
A. Maneuver Group Analysis 
The first hurdle to overcome with ERBS was to determine how much fuel was remaining in the tanks. There were 
many sources of information including blow-down curves and various inconsistent bookkeeping records. The 
largest uncertainty came from the telemetered value of pressure, which was accurate to *4 psia. Using a pressure vs. 
mass fuel curve, this 4 psia difference corresponded to 221bm of mass. As a result the error bars on the fuel estimate 
became *22 lbm. The bookkeeping values that were available were also from a prior de-orbit sequence that was 
performed in the summer of 2002. Since that time, many yaw maneuvers were performed for which no accounting 
of fuel usage was done properly due to changes in record keeping approach. As a result, this became another factor 
of uncertainty. This error was smaller than that of the 4 psia difference in pressure and therefore deemed 
inconsequential in determining the error bars. Using the several different methods of mass determination, including 
Pressure-Volume-Temperature (PVT) calculations, bookkeeping, and blowdown curves, a final mass of 175 lbm 
was estimated for planning purposes. Using the largest known error of *22 Ibm, the final value used was 175522 
lbm as indicated in Table 1. 
Table 1 Fuel Mass Remaining Sources 
Obtaining the starting mass then yielded the way to actual planning of the maneuvers. The venting of the fuel was 
supposed to occur during the month of September with four 5-hour burns (Table 5.1.1-2). Ball Aerospace & 
Technologies Corporation, the manufacturer, was tasked with providing the duty cycles for the four orbit adjust 
thrusters. These four thrusters were modulated by leaving two of the four on for the entire period while the other 
two were turned off at a specified interval of time. This modulation sequence provided attitude stability for the 
spacecraft since the thrusters were not optimally aligned. 
Table.2 Burn Plan Using 175522 lbm mass remaining 
-- - 
- . -. .  - -- - - - -- - - . . - - .  . -. . - - --- - - -- - - - - - - -- - - 
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IX. ERBS Flight Dynamics Maneuver Summary 
I .  Burn I - Confidence Burn 
Bum 1 commenced on September 8th, 2005 at 16:33:29 GMT and had a duration of 20 minutes. It was a calibration 
bum to test the behavior of the four orbit adjust thrusters, from which Ball Aerospace was able to determine the duty 
cycle needed to maintain attitude stability. Using the argument of perigee pre- and post-maneuver, an efficiency of 
+4.5 percent was derived between observed and predicted data. 
2. Burn 2 - Confidence Burn 
Bum 2 commenced on September 13th, 2005 at 11:55:15 GMT and had a duration of five hours. This was the first 
of the three large bums to deplete the fuel remaining. The duty cycles were calculated from Burn 1 post-burn 
analysis and delivered to the FDF from Ball Aerospace. Thrusters B and C were to remain on for 100% of the time 
while thrusters A and D were turned on and off every two minutes, providing a duty cycles of 84% and 90% 
respectively. These loads were uplinked to the spacecraft in sets of 20 minute blocks. Using the argument of 
perigee pre- and post-maneuver, an efficiency of +3.88 percent was derived between observed and predicted data. 
3. Burn 3 -Depletion Burn I 
Bum 3 commenced on September 16th, 2005 at 11: 17:07 GMT and had a duration of five hours. This was the 
second of the three large burns to deplete the fuel remaining. Due to a disturbance in the attitude for Burn 2, the 
duty cycles for thruster D were lowered 2% in order to maintain attitude within acceptable tolerances. Using the 
argument of perigee pre- and post-maneuver, an efficiency of approximately +33% was derived between observed 
and predicted data. This large discrepancy might be due to the pressurant leaking into the tanks. Investigation is 
still underway. 
4. Burn 4 - Depletion Burn 11 
Bum 4 was supposed to be executed on September 20th, 2005 but administrative issues caused the bum to be 
cancelled. As a result of the delay, ERBS had to perform a yaw maneuver with very low pressure remaining in the 
fuel tanks, which caused unexpected attitude disturbances and heretofore mentioned Yaw Anomaly. Therefore, 
three more calibration bums were performed - 
3 October 1403 GMT - 16sec thruster A calibration 
2023 GMT - 16sec thruster C calibration 
5 October 1340 GMT - 4min 4 thruster calibration 
7 October 1450 GMT - lOrnin 4 thruster calibration 
The final burn was executed on October 13,2005 throughout the day using different sized command blocks, which 
allowed for better attitude stability as well as allowing for the cancellation of the bum as quickly as possible, if 
needed. Apparently, the pressure in the tanks did not experience a drastic drop when the fuel tanks became empty, 
but rather the pressure seemed to slowly decrease. As a result, the bum was continued the next day on October 14th, 
2005 where it was finally decided to terminate the mission. This slow pressure drop might have been reminiscent of 
a pressurant leak through the bladder of the tank, causing the pressurant to exit through the thrusters. Any analysis 
against predictions for this final bum would have shown erroneous results due to this problem encountered above. 
The following tables provide a list of the bums for day 1 and 2: 
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Day 1 (DAY 286) of the Final Depletion; 
Final Depletion Burn Summary 
Total Number of burns TOTAL BURN TIME 
70 516 Min 
X. Passivation 
Having completed all fuel depletion activities (bums), the ERBS End-of-Mission Engineering Team was satisfied 
that the threat of explosion had been removed from the propulsion system. The Tank Pressure was showing 40psi 
and the affects on spacecraft attitude had greatly diminished. It was decided to and passivate the spacecraft as 
planned and leave the thrusters open when the Spacecraft was terminated. The Thruster valves would close when 
the bus voltage dropped below 12 volts. 
The following steps were performed to decommission the spacecraft: 
Power Off ERBE-NS via Non-Scanner Power OFF procedure. 
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SAGE Power OFF. 
Disable appropriate Fault Management. 
Perform Demonstration Bum tests to ensure vent plan was properly modeled. 
Perform Confidence Bum operations over several orbits to ensure the attitude and orbit disturbance can 
be absorbed and are predictable. 
Perform Depletion Bum. 
C o n f m  hydrazine depletion. 
Ensure the EPS system the following remains power negative 
Leave Catbed Heaters ON 
Leave Survival Heaters ON 
Leave Instruments ON 
Disable all (4) Commandable Solar Array Circuits 
Change C/D Level to CD 4 (CAI = 1.10 @ 5 C - harder to reach 100 % SOC) 
Disable SPRU VT Reset signal 
Put in -5 Amp Mode 
Disable Command Storage Memory 
Perform final tape recorder playback. 
Disable Command Storage Memory 
Turn RF transmitter OFF. 
Close Network Support. 
The ERBS EOM Team was able to perform these operations over three TDRSS contacts. The final steps went 
smoothly and without incident. 
XI. Orbit Determination Accuracy 
Predicted post-maneuver ephemeredes were generated using GMAN thrust tables in GTDS Flight-Sectioned 
ephemeris jobs. Due to the long duration of the bums, it was not possible to utilize bum tables at an interval of 1- 
second without exceeding the GTDS limit of 5000 records in the thrust table. For this reason, it was necessary to 
use GMAN thrust tables with an interval of 10 seconds. The accuracy of the predicted post-maneuver ephemeris 
files generated with the thrust bum tables was good for the initial short bum, but poor for the long burns. 
While most ERBS passes were taken in non-coherent mode, following each bum a number of coherent tracking 
passes were scheduled for the purposes of post-maneuver orbit determination (OD). Coherent, or 2-way, tracking 
provides TDRS range and Doppler observations. For each maneuver, an acceptable orbit solution was available 
after three 20 to 30 minute passes. Starting with the first burn, and in a number of subsequent cases, post-maneuver 
range passes were intermittently bad, showing large biases. Range data was deemed generally untrustworthy on this 
account, and was excluded from most post-maneuver short-arc orbit solutions in favor of Doppler-only solutions. 
There was no loss of OD accuracy on this account, with the difference between Doppler-only solutions and solutions 
employing Doppler and good range data being on the order of 100 meters. ERBS post-maneuver three-pass 
solutions using only Doppler data had a prediction accuracy of better than 1 km by the next day's orbit update. 1- 
way data, which provided usable angle observations, was received from the Canberra Ground Station for the first 
maneuver, but was not used in the solution. The DSN angles were unnecessary due to presence of good TDRS data. 
The following table summarizes the accuracy of predicted post-maneuver ephemeris using GMAN thrust tables, and 
the post-maneuver short-arc ODs for the major bums for which good definitive post-maneuver OD was available. 
The differences listed are comparisons to longer-arc OD solutions generated on the day following the bum indicated. 
While the pre-maneuver prediction errors for large bums were considerable after 1.5 days, the error did not grow 
large enough to hamper acquisition during the 3-5 hour span required for post-maneuver OD. 
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Accuracy of Post-maneuver Short- 
arc Solution 
0.090 km by 050910/000000 
0.168 km by 050915/000000 
0.077 km by 050918/000000 
Maneuver Span 
20050908/161329-163329 
20050913/115500-165500 
20050916/111700-161700 
Accuracy of Predicted Post-maneuver 
Best Estimated Trajectory 
20 km by 050910/000000 
295 km by 050915/000000 
148 km by 0509 18/000000 
The last valid ERBS TDRS data was received on 051014/213200. No orbit solution was obtainable using the last of 
the TDRS passes on October 14, and the tracking data showed indications that at the time of termination of tracking 
the ERBS orbit was still being perturbed by thrusting or outgassing. 
Prior to commencement of depletion activities, ERBS OD was supported routinely using the Real-Time Orbit 
Determination (RTOD) system extended Kalman filter. Due to lack of past experience supporting ERBS maneuvers 
in RTOD, GTDS was chosen as the prime OD tool for the depletion bums. Nevertheless, FDF did make an effort to 
fly ERBS in RTOD throughout the maneuvers and was successful in maintaining the ERBS orbit state in RTOD 
through the depletion sequence by placing ERBS in "upset" mode beginning at the start of each bum and keeping 
ERBS in upset mode through a sufficient span of post-maneuver tracking data. Placing ERBS in upset mode does 
not apply any delta-V to the state, but instead applies large state deweighting, forcing the filter to follow the 
incoming tracking data. In cases where biased range data was not automatically sigma-edited by the Kalman filter, 
gross measurement deweighting was applied to the range data to minimize its effect on the state update. ERBS was 
taken out of upset mode after a sufficient amount of tracking data has been received to recover the post-maneuver 
orbit. For the large bums, at least 3 post-maneuver passes were required. Determination of when the post-maneuver 
state has reconverged was made by examining the residual of the first point of each post-maneuver pass. Low first 
point residuals indicate that the state has propagated accurately from the last point of the prior pass and that RTOD 
has reconverged to an accurate post-maneuver state. 
XII. COLA - Collision Avoidance 
The NASA policy NPD 8710.3b "NASA Policy for Limiting Orbital Debris Generation" states that the mission's 
programlproject manager responsibilities include "Consulting with the Department of Defense S Cheyenne Mountain 
Operations Center prior to significant spacecraft operational or end-ofmission maneuvers", defined as those 
resulting in a change of spacecraft altitude of lkm or larger. 
Performing collision avoidance (COLA) analysis under circumstances in which multiple maneuvers were planned 
and executed within a fairly short timeframe was not something the ERBS support teams had done before. There 
was the added complication that the ERBS and EO-1 maneuvers and collision avoidance analyses were also 
underway. After several iterations, the team settled on the following: 
a. Ephemeris files contain only the next bum (i.e. one bum at a time) 
b. Ephemeris files are 7-days in duration 
c. Nominal plan: Screen budno-bum cases at Bum-2, Bum-1, Burn+l (updated no-bum only) 
d. Not possible for ERBS bums separated by only one day 
e. Screen at Bum-1 if the Bum-2 screening contains a conjunctor of concern 
f. Criteria for additional analysis/discussion: Total miss distance less than 4km 
g. Burn/No-Bum ephemerides from the FDF are delivered prior to 12 EST; the results are delivered by 6PM 
EST. 
For ERBS, the FDF generated the bum and no-bum ephemerides and USSTRATCOM performed the collision 
avoidance analysis and distributed the results. Due to the complicated situation, the FOT prepared a detailed 
schedule, updated frequently, which was followed by all parties 
XIII. ERBS Flight Dynamics Lessons Learned 
1. Lack of maneuver databases made it difficult to accurately assess historical propellant usage. 
2. Do not include too much information for maneuver summaries that are deliverables especially if the input 
is manually entered. 
3. Have as much information as possible in electronic form so that finding information is easier: e.g., all the 
old documents that we had to go through in order to pull out data. It would be less time consuming if we 
could just do a search on - fuel - and all the pertinent documents and pages come up. 
4. ERBS does pre-date all desktop publishing software, but scanning and imaging of old documents in 
electronic form would have been quite useful. 
5.  Make sure everyone is cross-trained and proficient on all software used prior to maneuvers. 
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6. Mixing of SI and English units in output and input was and is dangerous and caused problems during 
planning and execution of the plan 
7. Have hardcopy/softcopy documents located in one central and organized area for the missions. Everyone 
has documents that pertain to all missions at their desks, in filing cabinets in their offices, and in the ops 
room. This makes it difficult and time consuming to find documents that pertain to a subject. 
8. It is Recommend that future decommissioning efforts not be performed during the same time period if all 
possible. Working on ERBS and UARS EOM Activities caused confusion by all parties. In some areas, 
due to availability of FD personnel the same personnel worked the same missions, therefore work load 
reduced quality checking and meetings. 
9. Avoid having mission meetings scheduled on the same day as the maneuvers. 
10. Schedule more TDRS coherent tracking data events immediately following the maneuvers. A number of 
non-coherent passes were scheduled after the maneuver instead. This increased the waiting period to 
determine an orbit solution before the Network could obtain the success of the maneuver. 
11. The GTDS limitation of 5000 records to the GMAN thrust table required propagation through the long 
burns at a step size of 10 seconds. This may have been a reason for the large prediction errors using the 
GMAN thrust tables. 
XIV. Yaw Maneuver Anomaly 
A third 300 minute fuel depletion bum for the ERBS End-of-Mission (EOM) activities was scheduled to occur on 20 
September 2005. However, on 19 September all remaining depletion bums were suspended at the direction of 
Headquarters until further notice. It was anticipated that the remaining amount of the hydrazine fuel would have 
been depleted during the September 19 bum operations. This stoppage of the decommissioning plan necessitated 
the execution of a 180 degree yaw maneuver on 26 September in order to keep the sun on the solar arrays, thereby 
maintaining the spacecraft's power-safe condition. This yaw turn is nominally performed once every month, and in 
this situation consisted of a +X forward to -X forward maneuver. It should be noted that the original 
decommissioning plan had the fuel depletion and final spacecraft passivation occurring by 23 September, which 
would have avoided the need for a yaw turn. 
It was realized by the ERBS EOM team prior to the yaw maneuver that a potential problem existed since the 
procedure, which consisted of open-loop thruster commands activated out of spacecraft normal memory, would 
require modifications to account for the reduced propulsion tank pressure environment. Ball Aerospace performed 
analysis that showed that using the previously executed +X to -X forward yaw turn command load with the lower 
tank pressure would result in the spacecraft tumbling. Since the power subsystem on ERBS had been limping along 
for years, a tumble condition would very well jeopardize spacecraft safety prior to the planned passivation 
completion. 
An AETD (Code 500) peer review of the +X to -X forward 180 degree yaw turn was conducted on 22 September. 
This review was held in order to assess the expected spacecraft maneuver performance in light of concerns which 
were identified following the stoppage of hydrazine fuel depletion activities. Members of the GSFC Mission 
Engineering and Systems Analysis Division.Code 590 supported the independent review: 
Ball ACDS Engineers presented via teleconference analysis regarding the modification of the command load 
procedure so as to safely perform the required yaw maneuver. This modification utilized the ACS and 
Propulsion information gleaned from the 16 September 300-minute depletion burn in order to adjust the pitch 
thruster commands in the yaw maneuver procedure, thereby accounting for the reduction in the propulsion tank 
pressure from the previous execution of the +X to -X maneuver, which occurred on 13 July 2005. The analysis 
revealed that the new thrust level was 85.2% of the July 2005 level. Maneuver simulation using updated thruster 
forces corresponding to the tank pressure reduction and the modification of the thruster commands showed 
acceptable yaw maneuver performance. The independent reviewers agreed that the planned modifications to the 
procedure would result in a successful maneuver. 
On 26 September 2005 (Day 269) at 20: 13 GMT the 180 deg +X to -X forward yaw maneuver was initiated. An 
anomaly occurred during the maneuver's execution. It became apparent that the modification of the open-loop pitch 
thruster commands in the yaw maneuver procedure did not sufficiently remove all of the momentum bias along the 
spacecraft pitch axis prior to the yaw turn. This resulted in the situation of the ACS trying to precess a momentum 
vector around 180 deg, thereby causing a large spacecraft nutation. This resulted in the spacecraft starting to 
tumble, resulting in lower power subsystem charging and intermittent TDRS contacts using the zenith OMNI 
antenna. 
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During one of the contacts it was determined that the ACS still had large roll and pitch angles which would have 
taken the normal ACS controller many orbits to correct. The ACS was then commanded into B-Dot mode at 
269/23:48:53 GMT. B-Dot mode utilizes magnetometer information to create torque rod commands which result in 
the unloading of excess spacecraft momentum. 
At 270102:58:28 GMT, it was observed during a TDRS pass (note that AOS came only 4 minutes prior to the 
scheduled LOS) that the spacecraft roll and pitch angles were less than 30 degrees. It was then decided to place the 
ACS back into Normal mode. The ACS was able to correct its pointing attitude so that by the morning of 27 
September the spacecraft attitude was back to normal with the power subsystem charging up nominally. 
Post-maneuver performance analysis by Ball Aerospace indicted that the thrust level at the start of the burn was 
actually 72% of the July 2005 level instead of the 85,2%.previously seen on the 16 September Bum. The EOM 
Team learned the hard way that execution of open-loop thruster firings becomes more precarious as the propulsion 
fuel level is depleted and that the system would not always remain stable. As expected during the EOM activities. 
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XV. UARS 
The Upper Atmospheric Research Satellite was deployed from the Space Shuttle Discovery (STS 48) on September 
15, 199 1. The spacecraft mission was research and exploration of the upper reaches of the atmosphere [6]. .UARS 
was a more robust and fault tolerant spacecraft then ERBS and was able to perform perigee lowering maneuvers and 
was able to deplete its fuel while significantly shortening its on orbit life. 
The instrument operations for HRDI, PEM, SUSIM, and SOLSTICE were ceased on August 5,2005, except for 
occasionally activating the PEM instrument for load balancing purposes. The HALOE instrument continued 
collecting measurements until mid October. 
The UARS End-of-Mission Team began decommissioning operations in September of 2005 and performed the final 
passivation on 14 December 2005. The End-of-Mission Team passivated the spacecraft after having performing a 
series of Perigee Lowering Maneuvers which lowered the orbit to 5 18km x 38 lkm. The UARS Team began 
passivating the spacecraft on DOY 348 14 December 2005 at 1615z. To ensure the power system is stabile an 
electrical load was placed on the batteries and the Electrical Power system was placed in a low current mode. The 
Attitude control system was powered off and finally the transponder was power off. The UARS Spacecraft was 
commanded off at 17: 16:37z 
UARS completed 78084 orbits over 
5208 Mission days. UARS was the first 
spacecraft of the first major flight 
element of NASA's Mission to Planet 
Earth. 
The UARS End-of-Mission plan 
followed the NASA guidelines preferred 
method which calls for missions to lower 
their orbit perigee as much as possible, 
both to minimize the on-orbit lifetime, as 
well as to deplete all onboard hydrazine 
fuel. The baseline plan strived to 
achieve all other NASA mission 
termination objectives. Formulation and 
execution of the UARS End-of-Mission 
Plan involved consideration of current 
spacecraft capabilities, application of 
NASA policies and guidelines, and 
analysis of UARS disposal options. 
An End-of-Mission operation timeline 
and associated details are provided 
It should be noted that Battery 2 suffered 
a cell failure on 21 August 2005 just 
prior to implementation of the End-of- 
Mission Plan [7]. This failure was one of the predefined trigger points on which the emergency End-of-Mission 
timelines would be invoked. As the EOM Team prepared the emergency timeline the UARS engineering team 
developed contingency operations, which allowed the EPS system to remain stabile through the normal EOM 
timeline. 
The UARS Engineering Team also developed a 4 Thruster Mode on the Modular Propulsion system. UARS though 
equipped with four Orbit Adjust Thrusters, was configured to use just two during normal operations. By updating 
the Flight Software (FSW), the engineering Team was able to use all four 51b thrusters during the Perigee Lowering 
Maneuvers (PLM). This new thruster configuration improved the thruster efficiency fiom 50% to over 70% thus 
reducing the numbers of maneuvers from 24 to 8. 
As the PLMs were executed the UARS EOM Team coordinated all Collision Avoidance (COlA) activities through 
the GSFC Debris Avoidance Working Group (DAWG) and Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center (CMOC). As 
UARS started approaching the International Space Station special care was taken to ensure all concerned parties 
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were aware of the UARS EOM plans and activities. Weekly status meetings were held in preparation of the final 
maneuver activities. Due to the uncertainty of remaining fuel and the uncertainty of the final orbit, the UARS EOM 
Team decided that it would prudent to perform Apogee Lowering Maneuvers (ALM) to completely empty the 
remaining fuel. These activities ensured that UARS and the ISS would have adequate separation and ample 
screening opportunities to detect a close approach. 
UARS orbit will continue to decay until it reenters. The nominal prediction for reentry is July 2009 (4.5 years after 
the final Bum). This is based on nominal solar flux. UARS will be continually tracked by Cheyenne Mountain 
Operations Center (CMOC) until it reenters. UARS Was designed, built and deployed from Space Shuttle 
Discovery (STS-48) prior to NASA policy formulation (launched pre-1993), 
XVI. UARS Status and Disposal Assessment 
The following items summarize key findings incorporated into the UARS End-of-Mission Plan. These findings 
reflected status of the observatory, applicability of NASA disposal guidelines, and an assessment of the spacecrafts 
disposal options. UARS was originally conceived to be retrieved by the shuttle at the end of its mission. Due to 
changes in the shuttle program this was no longer an option. 
On September 28 2001, UARS was designated as a Science Traceability Mission for the Aura spacecraft (launched 
15 July 2004). UARS payloads are designated to support the on-orbit validation and calibration of the payloads of 
Aura for the first year of operations. 
XVII. UARS Observatory Status: 
The Upper Atmospheric Research Satellite was deployed from the Space Shuttle (STS-48) STS 48 on September 15, 
1991. The spacecraft mission was research and exploration of the upper reaches of the atmosphere. UARS was 
placed in a585 km orbit inclined 57". It was originally conceived to be retrieved by the shuttle at the end of its 
mission. Due to changes in the shuttle program this is no longer an option. UARS is more robust and fault tolerant 
then ERBS and was able to perform perigee lowering maneuvers and was able to deplete its fuel while significantly 
shortening its on orbit life time. 
A. UARS Subsystem Status: 
As a whole UARS was still a sound spacecraft but a series of component failure had made it single fault tolerant. It 
is able to perform its science mission in a reduced role due to Instrument and bus failures 
1. Electrical Power System (EPS) 
In 1996 1 of the 3 spacecraft batteries suffered an internal failure and was taken offline and placed in reduced 
service. There had also been failures of the Solar Array Drives (A&B) which impacted UARS ability to optimize the 
performance of the Power Subsystem. The EPS subsystem is still able to provide sufficient power for the bus and 
operation up to 7 of 10 instruments (depending on payload combinations and operations and solar beta angle), and 
supports all command and telemetry functions. 
2. Command and Data Handling System (CDH): 
UARS has limited data storage capacity. Only one-quarter of the original tape recorder capacity is still available 
UARS had been able to manage data capture by increasing the number of real-time TDRSS contacts over each orbit 
balancing the direct downlink and recorder playbacks for achieve their science data goals. 
3. Attitude Control System (ACS) 
The ACS system has suffered multiple failures over the course of the mission. Both pairs of Earth sensors and Star 
Trackers had suffered failures and were only used in limited situations Due to these failures only limited on-board 
(autonomous) safe mode commanding is available. Loss of 5 of the 6 Gyros has impacted the spacecraft ability to 
meet science pointing requirements. Due to seven years of inactivity the on-board propulsion system had been 
unserviceable. Through efforts of the FOT the system has been recovered and was available to support orbit- 
lowering maneuvers. 
4. Flight Sojbvare (FS W): 
UARS has a robust flight software package with ample Fault Management and Telemetry Monitors. There are no 
limitations within the FSW system that would have impacted the End-of-Mission Activity. 
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5. Payload Status 
Five of the ten of the UARS payloads were still performing routine operations. These five payloads include three 
earth instruments (HALOE, HRDI, and PEM) and two of the three solar instruments (SUSIM and SOLSTICE). A 
sixth instrument (MLS) is available but required unique power management for operation. Three instruments are no 
longer operational: CLAES was designed with a limited life and operations ceased with their as-planned depletion of 
its cryogen supply, WINDII, Operations ceased in 2000 due to a Y2K problem in the science data process system 
that was too costly too fw. ISAMS and ACRIM operations ceased due to instrument failures. 
X UARS Disposal Method 
At the Direction of the ESMO project office, UARS will be lowered through a series of retrograde maneuvers to an 
approximate 565 km X 375 km elliptical orbit. All the remaining available fuel was vented from its propellant tank. 
The spacecraft batteries were put in a trickle charge mode all commandable relays were disconnected from the solar 
array and the transponders will be powered off. Applicability of NASA Guidelines and Policies to the UARS End 
of Life Plan 
A. Applicability of NASA Guidelines and Policies to UARS 
Launched prior to NASA policy formulation (launched pre-1993), the applicability to UARS of current NASA End 
of Life Disposal policies is limited to defining operations that minimize the UARS lifetime and minimize UARS as 
an on-orbit or reentering debris hazard. 
NASA policies and guidelines for End of Life disposal of spacecraft are covered by: NPD 87 10.3B and the 
associated NASA Safety Standard: "Guidelines and Assessment Procedures for Limiting Orbital Debris (NSS 
1740.14)". ( http://sn-callisto.jsc.nasa.gov/mitigate/safieystandard.html) 
1. Disposal Assessment 
In preparation for mission termination, various assessments had been performed to determine UARS capability 
relative to end-of-life disposal. Highlights of these assessments follow. 
2. Lifetime Analysis 
Based on atmospheric projections, the orbital lifetime projections for UARS in its current (561 krn circular) orbit 
range from 10 to 25 years. Using existing fuel to lower the orbit, the worst case UARS lifetime projection is 
reduced to less than 5 years from the minimum achievable elliptical orbit. 
3. Debris Assessment 
The debris field predicted to survive an uncontrolled reentry is approximately 22 rn2. [Refer to "Reentry 
Survivability Analysis of Upper Atmospheric Research Satellite (UARS), JSC-29647, J.J. Marichalar and W.C. 
Rochelle, January 2002.1 This debris estimate is based on a Johnson Space Center Office for Orbital Debris analysis 
using the Object Reentry Survivability Analysis Tool (ORSAT) program 
4. Casualty Risk Associated With an Uncontrolled Reentry Of UARS 
Based upon the JSC ORSAT analysis referenced above, the risk of casualty of an uncontrolled UARS reentry has 
been identified as 1: 3,600. 
5. Controlled Reentry Assessment 
Controlled reentry of UARS [via planned maneuvers that would result in the UARS debris field being scattered 
within an uninhabited (ocean) region] is not a viable option. Insufficient fuel is available to achieve the necessary 
orbit lowering. Even with alternate scenarios, such as drag assisted deboost, insufficient thrust exists to provide the 
necessary control for performance of the final burn. 
6. UARS Shuttle Retrieval Study 
The technical feasibility of a UARS recovery by a shuttle was established. However due to significant 
programmatic challenges (cost, risk, and schedule), NASA Headquarters opted not to pursue this option. 
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XI Implementing UARS End-of-Mission Plan 
As Per the NASA Headquarters directives, a timeline was developed to complete the EOM activity by 3 1 December 
2005. Based on this date, the plan was implemented [7]. Due to the battery anomaly science operations, which 
were planned to support HALOE through mid December, were conducted only when the bus could support the 
additional power load. Since fuel depletion activities could only be done while the spacecraft was in reverse flight, 
the yaw turn to reverse flight executed 12 September 2005 was the jump off point of the EOM Plan. Since most of 
the EOM Team was also supporting the ERBS EOM activities, this offset allowed them to complete most of the 
ERBS activities before starting the UARS activities. It should be noted that even with the offset the team was 
stressed during the dual EOM operations. ERBS EOM operation incurred an administrative delay in completing the 
execution of the EOM Plan. This delay occurred just prior to the ERBS final depletion burn. This caused almost 
three week delay in the final passivation of ERBS, which further exacerbated the situation. 
A. Flight Software update for 4-Thruster Mode 
The most significant engineering decision made in planning the EOM Activities was the decision to modify flight 
software to enable the Propulsion Modular (PM) to use the four Orbit Adjust Thrusters. A Flight Software Patch 
was developed by the UARS Engineering Team based on experiences with a similar Propulsion Modular used on 
Landsat 5. The FSW Patch to allow for 4 thruster operations was uplinked on 30 August 2005 afier being tested and 
verified on the UARS Simulator. This patch involved updating branch commands which deselected the 2 alternate 
thrusters with no-op commands. 
Series of calibration bums were performed to test new mode 
Sept 1,05 1 6 second burn I Test firing of all four Translation Thrusters 
Sept 14,05 1 30 second bum #1 ] Translation thrusters fired followed by attitude firings 
Sept 19,05 1 30 second bum #2 I Translation thruster off pulse wl attitude firings 
Sept 22,05 1 2.5 minute bum ( Pitch and yaw biases added to account for transient 
This patch improved the overall thruster efficiency as well as decreased the number of maneuvers required to 
deplete the fuel remaining on board the spacecraft from 26 to 8. 
B. Mission Termination Actions 
The UARS EOM Maneuver Activities were constrained to occurring in view of TDRSS and at apogee or perigee 
*lOMins. The FOT Mission Planner was able to work with the FD Maneuver Group to ensure the needed resources 
were schedule for these activities. Once the resources were allocated by the NCC based on mission priority, conflict 
resolution was performed to ensure all required supports were scheduled to complete all mission objectives. The 
TDRSS supports for the maneuver operations were scheduled as critical supports. 
The planned End-of-Mission activities were: 
The following steps were performed to decommission the spacecraft: 
Passivation Objectives 
Limit orbit lifetime after mission completion 
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Change circular orbit 553x543km into an elliptical 513 x 381km 
UARS will re-enter uncontrolled in 4 to 4 % years 
Make spacecraft chemically inert 
CLAES cryogen tank empty 
Deplete hydrazine fbel tank by lowering orbit 
Power off non-vital components 
NBTR-B Power OFF * 
Platform Sun Sensor (PSS) * 
Solar Array Drive Electronics (SADDE) * 
SSPP Gimbal Drive Electronics (GDE) * 
Power off Instruments via RTS 00 & 01 * 
Some buses come on, will be turned off manually 
Deplete on-board energy sources 
Disable spacecraft attitude control 
Prevent spacecraft from being an RF source 
*Indicates action can be done early, prior to any formal passivation activity 
The UARS Mission Termination Timeline is given as follows: 
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The final passivation of the spacecraft will power on passive EPS power loads to ensure that the batteries do not 
overcharge and explode. The last steps were to turn off attitude control and RF transponders. The turn off was as 
follows: 
Turn on EPS load 
Primary heaters (335W) ; Thermostat controlled 
Secondary & ATK heaters (94.5W) ; Thermostat controlled 
Alignment heaters on ( A & B master) 
All alignment heaters (1 lOW) ; no thermostat control 
MACS heaters (166W) ; Thermostat controlled 
MPS heaters (105W) ; Thermostat controlled 
Set VT Level to VT-1 
Set Constant Current mode to .75A 
Disable Attitude Control 
Power off Magnetic Torque Rods 
Earth Sensor 2 off (ESA-2) 
TAM1&2of f  
Reaction Wheels off (Roll, Pitch, Yaw, Skew) 
Fine Sun Sensor off (FSS) 
Gyros off 
Turn off RF 
Turn Transponder A on (upper OMNI antenna) 
Halt OBC and force SIC into safehold 
Disable HGA electronics 
Turn Transponder A & B off 
XI1 UARS Burn Plan Summary 
This is a summary report of the GSFC Flight Dynamics Facility (FDF) support for the UARS End of Mission. 
The fuel remaining on UARS was insufficient to re-enter the spacecraft so instead the fuel was vented by multiple 
maneuvers firing the four orbit adjust thrusters. This produced a net delta-V in the anti-velocity direction at apogee 
which lowered the perigee altitude. The UARS orbit after the final maneuver was slightly more eccentric, 5 13 x 
381km, with a predicted decay within 5 years. 
A. Maneuver Group 
The issues face in decommissioning UARS included: 
There was no way to vent fuel except by performing maneuvers 
Insufficient fuel to maneuver to re-entry 
A goal of completing the decommissioning expeditiously so less than optimal maneuvers were 
acceptable within limits 
Constraints on the maneuver location, such as the need to be performed when in view by a TDRS 
Use of all 4 thrusters simultaneously was not a configuration that had been used during the mission 
The potential of collision with International Space Station (ISS) producing a goal to minimize the time 
over which this might happen 
1. Analysis 
The first hurdle to overcome with UARS was to determine how much fuel was remaining in the tanks. There were 
many sources of information including blow-down curves and different bookkeeping records. A bookkeeping value 
of 355.6 lbm was obtained from the previous maneuver that was executed on September 2001. A PVT value of 
354.1 lbm was obtained using a pressure of 210.735 psia, temperature of 24.55 "C for the small tanks and 12.54 "C 
for the auxiliary tank. The largest error came from the telemetered value of pressure which was accurate to 1 2  psia. 
Using this error along with the above temperatures and pressures, a range of 357.1 to 351.0 lbm was obtained. 
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Obtaining the starting mass then yielded the way to actual planning of the maneuvers. A discussion ensued in 
which all four thrusters were to be used for the deorbit sequence. Perigee lowering was the ultimate goal in order to 
bring UARS below ISS altitude. Nominally UARS had only been using a two thruster mode for orbit maneuvers. 
As a result, there were a few test bums to determine how the spacecraft reacted to all thrusters firing. Since the 
maneuvers were performed retrograde (against the velocity vector) to lower perigee, the change in semi-major axis 
was used as a benchmark of performance. 
The perigee lowering bums were supposed to occur during the month of October and December with a total of seven 
18-minute burns and a 4 minute bum (Table 5.1 .l-1). There were no maneuvers in the month of November since a 
yaw maneuver changed the orientation of the spacecraft and thrusters, which would have provided a prograde effect 
causing perigee to increase instead of decrease. 
Table 4. UARS Perigee Lowering Burn Plans 
The planned times of the maneuvers were constrained by several factors. The bum had to be within a TDRS 
contact, the apogee had to be as closely centered as possible in the pass, and there should be about a 5 minute buffer 
at the beginning of the pass for maneuver preparation. These three factors added a level of complexity in planning 
the burns since the products that contain the pass times and apogee times needed to be updated after every burn plan. 
I 
1 .  
;#I Mnv Start (UTC) 
2. Calibration Burns 
There were a series of four calibration bums that were performed prior to the perigee lowering maneuvers. The first 
two maneuvers, 6 seconds and 13 seconds, were performed when UARS was in an orientation of perigee raising and 
the last two, 30 seconds and 2.5 minutes, were performed during an orientation where UARS lowered perigee. The 
following tables show the results of all four calibration bums. A prediction of 90% duty cycle was used for planning 
of the calibration bums. 
Post Maneuver (at end of mnv) 
3. Perigee Lowering Maneuvers 
The baseline called for the PLM 1 to be performed 20 September. This maneuver was postponed at the request of 
NASA Headquarters. The baseline bum plan assumed a higher efficiency then what was actually achieved ... 
After analysis of the 2.5 minute calibration bum it was noted that the duty cycles were not at 90% as predicted but 
rather at 71.79% since the A1 and B1 thrusters were performing at about 55% due to off pulsing attitude control. 
This duty cycle improved over the longer duration bums because the initial attitude transients had a lower impact on 
the overall bum duration. Using these results the PLMs commenced on October 4th, 2005 and had durations of 18 
minutes. The maneuver analysis was very accurate and spacecraft performed smoothly. Due to the UARS Yaw 
Cycle and the planned bum schedule only 5 of the 8 PLMs were performed prior to the Yaw back to forward flight. 
Burn 
Duration 
(minf 
Apoged 
AKiude (km) 
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Pre ~aneu&r (at end of mnv) 
Perigee 
Alfiuds (km) 
Propellant 
(kg) 
Propellant 
(kg) 
Apogee 
Altitude (km) 
Perigee 
ARiude (km) 
4. Intermediate Analysis 
After Burn 5 an analysis of FDF software was performed since the PVT calculations from the FOT, using the 
current tank pressure, did not match the GMAN final mass at the end of the bum. There appeared to be a large 
discrepancy between the two values and GMAN was underestimating the fuel usage per burn. Since the last few 
burns were not to be executed until December, the analysis went into some depth during the month of November. In 
this section we will summarize our findings and results. 
Prior to starting any analysis, PVT calculations were performed at FDF using actual telemetered pressures for all the 
burns using the initial loading conditions of the tanks. Tables 5 and 6 summarize the inputs and results. 
Initial Conditions of the Tanks 
I I I 
Propellant Density (lbmiinA3) 
- 
Tl  1 T2 I T3 I T4 I Average 
0.0363276 0.0363276 0,0363276 0.0365115 0.0363736 
-1- - - - -  -- - - - 
mO ( Ibm) 
TI  I T2 I TJ 1 T4 I Total 
I Temperature 1 
Load~ng 55.9671 55.9671 55.3671 263 .0001 450.900 167.900 - kt- 303.60 TI..T~ 
nrr For all e m t s  
Pressure 
- - ~ - - -  ~ - -  I Pressure I Temperature (Centigrade) I propellant mass (Ibm) (eq 3-10 right side) ( combined 
Centigrade 
Ti  I T2 ] T3 I T4 (Average 
Table 6 UARS PVT Calculations for Burns 1-5 
Table 5 UARS Inztial Loading Conditions of Fuel Tanks 
Rankinc 
Tl I T2 1 T3 1 T4 l~verage 
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533.808 533.806 23.40 23.40 23.40 17 .40  533.30E 523.008 21.90 531.108 
Using the PVT values, the differences between GMAN and the PVT calculations for mass usage, remaining mass, 
and end pressures were calculated and plotted in the figures below. The calibration bums were included in the 
GMAN data but not for the PVT calculations. Graph 1 shows that the software was underestimating the fuel usage 
by about 5-6 lbm per burn when compared to PVT calculations. As a result, there was a difference of about 10 kg at 
the end of bum 5 between GMAN and PVT even though the difference in pressures was only about 2-3 psia (Graph 
m\ 
Actual Propellant Used Per Burn (GMAN I PVT) 
Initial Mass = 160.619 kg 1001 Mass = 204.527 kg) 
s o m -  
5m. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Actual Propellant Remaining After Bum (GMAN I PVT) 
(Inlal Mass = 160.619 kg IBOL Mass =204 527 kg) 
1mm 
3 4 5 8 
Bum # 
owe.: &&--- 
I 2 1 4 I 6 1 I 9 I 0  
4 
Burn # 
Graph I - UARS GMAN vs. PVT Mass Usedper Burn 
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During the course of the analysis that was performed to rescale the GMAN ISP equation, two different values for the 
volumes of the tanks and different initial loading conditions surfaced. As a result, this information became a source 
of error in the PVT calculations that were obtained. This complication yielded the data contained in the following 
Table 7 and Graph 5. The table summarizes all the possible combinations of two sets of volumes and three sources 
of loading conditions and the figure shows the current propellant mass for the six cases in the table. 
I ATK: D i a p h r a g m  Tanks D r t r  Shr-tr (7OD-F) I 
Table 7. UARS Fuel Remaining Afer Bum 5 Using AN Possible Combinations of Volumes and Loading 
Conditions 
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1 
I UARS: Case Number vs. Remaining Propellant 
3 4 5 
Case 
Graph 5 -PVT Case Number vs. Propellant Remaining 
As the plot shows, the different loading conditions and volumes have a great effect on the remaining mass. There is 
a difference of about 25.178 lbm (1 1.421 kg) from the first case to the fifth case. Since the uncertainty in the fuel 
remaining was so large, a different set of conditions were imposed on the maneuvers following bum 5. Case one 
was used to determine how long it would take to bum off the minimum amount of estimated fuel remaining. This 
value was calculated to be 17.23 minutes using GMAN software with a rescaled ISP equation of 0.88. Since there 
was less than a minute of error for an 18 minute bum, bum 6 was to be executed as bums 1-5 had been before with 
lowering of perigee. The remaining mass following bums 7 and 8 was all within the error of the analysis described 
above. It was decided that the maneuvers should be done to lower apogee instead of perigee because the UARS 
altitude at perigee was approaching ISS altitude. The uncertainty of the maneuver posed the problem of having 
accurate predictions for collision avoidance with ISS when lowering the UARS's perigee even further. 
5. Burn 6 
Bum 6 commenced on December lst, 2005 at 11:53:58 GMT and had a duration of 18 minutes. Using the semi- 
major axis pre- and post-maneuver, an efficiency of +1.62 percent was derived from comparing observed and 
predicted data. It was predicted that the main tanks were almost empty at the end of this bum. There was no 
temperature drop in the fuel observed from telemetry, which gave reason to believe that the tanks still had some fuel 
remaining. 
6. Burn 7 
Bum 7 commenced on December 6th, 2005 at 16:08:00 GMT and had a duration of 18 minutes. Using the semi- 
major axis pre- and post-maneuver, an efficiency of +3.04 percent was derived from comparing observed and 
predicted data. This maneuver was an apogee lowering maneuver rather than a perigee lowering maneuver as 
discussed in the intermediate analysis section. 
A fuel temperature drop was observed at the very beginning of this bum which gave reason to believe that the 3 
main tanks were empty and that there was only fuel left in the auxiliary tank. As a result, GMAN was re-executed 
with an ISP multiplicative factor of 1.0 for bums 6,7, and 8 to determine whether the earlier PVT calculations were 
in error. After executing GMAN for these three maneuvers a prediction of 2 minutes for bum 8 was obtained for 
fuel depletion. 
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7. Burn 8 
Bum 8 commenced on December 8th, 2005 at 16:26:01 GMT and had a duration of 1.5 minutes. Using the semi- 
major axis pre- and post-maneuver, an efficiency of -56.57 percent was derived ffom comparing observed and 
predicted data. This large discrepancy is due to the exhaustion of the fuel remaining on board. The pressure 
decreased at a faster rate towards the end than was anticipated by the software model. This maneuver was also 
apogee lowering. 
The fact that the maneuver lasted for 1.5 minutes indicated that the GMAN ISP equation was correct with a 
multiplicative factor of 1.0. It seems that the inconsistency of volumes and loading conditions provided too great an 
error to use PVT calculations to determine the mass remaining in the tanks. 
A final orbit state was obtained by the Orbit Determination Group on December 12", 2005 after the last bum 
sequence: 
Position Vectors -6690.218350 -552.600873 1556.115452 (km) 
Velocity Vectors 1.749675210 -4.102465692 6.11543 1364 (kmlsec) 
Interval Between Ephemeride Points . 60.000 
Coordinate System is .......... TRUE OF DATE 
Epoch (YYYYMMDD.HHMMSSSSS) .... 20051212.100000001 
Semimajor Axis (km) ... 6825.68 1605 Flight Path Angle (deg) 89.914719 
Eccentricity .............. 0.009685 Eccentric Anomaly (deg) 17 1.159502 
Inclination (deg) ........ 56.99221 8 Period (min) .......... 93.535995 
Arg of Perigee (deg) ..... 204.377139 Perigee (km) ....... 381.441334 
........ Right Ascension (deg) .... 176.061 191 Apogee (krn) 5 13.649276 
Mean Anomaly (deg) ....... 171.074225 Mean Motion (deg/day) 5542.25 1423 
.... True Anomaly (deg) ....... 171.244376 GHA at epoch (deg) 79.804602 
Perigee Argument Secular Rate of Change (deglday) .. 1.901298248 
Ascending Node Secular Rate of Change (deglday) .... -4.281864983 
Decay Estimates 
The UARS final orbit state vector from was propagated to predict the orbital decay. The propagation was done with 
STK using the lifetime analysis tool. As can be seen in Figure 13, UARS will re-enter within 4.3 years when 
propagated using the nominal Jacchia-Roberts flux model. 
UARS Estimated Decay Rate - Post Burn #8 Analysis 
(Starting with: 513kmx381 km) 
600 -- 
...... Nominal Flux: Perigee 
Nominal Flux: Apogee 500 ---- I 
I 
li i I 3 400 - 
b I 
I 
Years 
Figure 13 - UARS Apogee and Perigee Decay 
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XIII Orbit Maneuver Results 
Orbit task personnel supported all UARS calibration and deorbit bums in real time. The orbit task was required to 
provide acquisition data throughout the deorbit sequence, to generate all routine and special request UARS products, 
and to provide Collision Avoidance (COLA) ephemeris files to Cheyenne Mountain personnel for COLA screening. 
The orbit task also provided ephemeris files to the maneuver planning task for the purposes of planning and 
calibrating the maneuvers. 
The 18-minute deorbit bums changed the UARS orbit by approximately 150 km (mainly along-track) by the end of 
the first two hours after the burn. The finite burn modeling capability of GTDS was employed to generate a pre- 
maneuver prediction which would be good enough to maintain acquisition during the 1-3 hours required after a 
maneuver to obtain an updated orbit solution. Predicted post-maneuver ephemeredes were generated using GMAN 
thrust tables in GTDS Flight-Sectioned ephemeris jobs. The thrust table generated by GMAN contains thrust 
vectors at l-second intervals throughout the duration of the burn. GTDS adds these thrust vectors to the force model 
during each integration step, thereby allowing GTDS to model a finite bum using the precise 3-dimensional GMAN 
model. 
For burns which were expected to run their full planned duration (Burns #1-6), a single predicted post-maneuver 
vector with an epoch shortly after the burn end time was sent out prior to bum start. However, prior to execution of 
Bum #7 and Bum #8 there was considerable uncertainty as to how long the bums would actually last, due to the 
uncertainty in the fuel remaining onboard UARS. FDF performed analysis prior to Bum #7 and reached the 
conclusion that 4 minutes was the maximum amount of error allowed in the predicted versus actual bum end time, in 
order to maintain acquisition throughout the 3-hour post-maneuver short-arc orbit determination (OD) processing 
span. As a result the following procedure was used for acquisition data support for Bum #7 and Bum #8. 
1. The bum was divided into 4-minute intervals and a separate GMAN burn prediction was generated for each 
possible burn duration case, using these intervals. For example, for the 24-minute Bum #7, predictions were 
generated for 4-minute, 8-minute, 12-minute, 16-minute, 20-minute, and 24-minute bum durations. 
2. A nominal (expected) bum duration was selected and a single post-maneuver IIRV was generated and sent to 
White Sands based on that duration. The IIRV epoch was chosen to be after the end of the bum pass and 
before the start of the next pass. 
3. Additional post-maneuver IIRVs were generated using each of the contingency bum durations generated in 
Step 1. The epoch for the contingency IIRVs was chosen to be after the end of the bum pass, but before the 
epoch of the nominal IIRV from Step 2. The contingency IIRVs were generated, but not transmitted before the 
bum. Setting the epoch of the contingency vectors earlier than the epoch of the nominal vector that was 
actually sent to White Sands ensured that, in the case a contingency vector needed to be sent, it would replace 
(kick out) the nominal vector with a later epoch. All contingency vectors were generated to the same epoch, 
since only one of the set would possibly need to be sent. 
4. When the bum was complete and the actual duration was known, the contingency vector generated using the 
bum duration that was within 2 minutes of the actual bum duration was sent to White Sands, overriding the 
pre-maneuver vector sent prior to the burn. 
This methodology was employed successfully for both Bum #7 and Bum #8. In the case of Bum #7, the bum was 
approximately 12 minutes longer than expected, requiring an immediate post-maneuver vector update. Bum #8 
terminated 10 minutes earlier than the selected nominal case, also requiring an immediate update. 
There was one instance, Bum #6, for which an incorrect post-maneuver vector was sent prior to the burn. In this 
case, an ephemeris which did not include the bum model was promoted as operational and used to generate the post- 
maneuver IIRV. Bum #6 ended at 20051201/1212 UTC and a subsequent pass at 1232 UTC was successful, but the 
UARS MOC and White Sands reported no RF on the pass beginning at 1328 UTC. FDF quickly realized that an 
incorrect vector had been sent and updated White Sands with a proper post-maneuver IIRV, which resulted in 
acquisition. 
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XIV Orbit Determination Accuracy 
UARS received nearly continuous 2-way TDRS Range and Doppler tracking throughout the entire deorbit period. 
The dense tracking meant that four to six TDRS 2-way passes were available for short-arc post-maneuver OD in the 
first 3-4 hours after each maneuver. No problems were observed in either the TDRS Range or Doppler data at any 
time during deorbit operations, and all post-maneuver solutions used both the Range and Doppler observations. 
Table 8 summarizes the accuracy of predicted post-maneuver ephemerides using GMAN thrust tables, and the post- 
maneuver short-arc ODs. The differences listed are comparisons of each to longer-arc OD baseline reference 
solutions generated on the day following the burn indicated. The numbers reported are the maximum ephemeris 
difference observed in the first 24 hours following the end of the maneuver. All of the post-maneuver short-arc 
solutions used 5 or 6 passes of TDRS Range and Doppler data, with the exception of the Bum #7 short-arc solution, 
which used 4 passes. With the exception of Bum #3, all of the predicted post-maneuver Best Estimated Trajectories 
were generated using an initial state determined from OD on the day of the bum, using all tracking data up until the 
bum start. As the table shows, the predicted post-maneuver ephemerides generated from the GMAN files were 
more than adequate for post-maneuver acquisition, and the accuracies of the short-arc solutions were quite good. 
Solutions performed following Bums #7 and #8 indicated that, in emergency situations, the orbit could be recovered 
with accuracy sufficient for acquisition with as little as one to two passes of post-maneuver TDRS range and 
Doppler data. 
1 
'~his~redic t ion was generated on the day prior to Burn # 3  
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
The last valid UARS TDRS data was received on 2005 12141171601 UTC. While the ERBS orbit was observed to 
be significantly perturbed by apparent out-gassing or other thrust-related forces right up until last contact, no such 
effect was observed on UARS. All solutions following UARS fuel depletion were clean and absent of any apparent 
perturbation straight up through the last contact. 
2 2005 100 
Maneuver Span 
20051004/17n~-1777 
Prior to commencement of deorbit activities, UARS OD was supported routinely using the Real-Time Orbit 
Determination (RTOD) system extended Kalman filter. Due to lack of past experience supporting UARS 
maneuvers in RTOD, GTDS was chosen as the prime OD tool for the deorbit bums. Nevertheless, FDF did make an 
' 
effort to fly UARS in RTOD throughout the maneuvers and was successful in maintaining the UARS orbit state in 
RTOD through the deorbit sequence by placing UARS in "upset" mode beginning at the start of each bum and 
keeping UARS in upset mode through a sufficient span of post-maneuver tracking data. Placing UARS in upset 
mode does not apply any delta-V to the state, but instead applies large state deweighting, forcing the filter to follow 
the incoming tracking data. Due to the magnitude of the UARS maneuvers, it was necessary to manually increase 
the amount of deweighting applied to the UARS state over that applied by the "canned RTOD upset in order to get 
enough uncertainty added to the state quickly enough to accept all of the post-maneuver tracking data. UARS was 
taken out of upset mode after a sufficient amount of tracking data had been received to recover the post-maneuver 
orbit, typically after four to six post-maneuver passes. Determination of when the post-maneuver state had 
reconverged was made by examining the residual of the first point of each post-maneuver pass. Small first point 
residuals indicated that the state had propagated accurately from the last point of the prior pass and that RTOD had 
reconverged to an accurate post-maneuver state. 
Table 8. Pre-maneuver and Short-Arc Ephemeris 24-hour Prediction Accuracy 
2005101811443-1501 
2005 102011209- 1227 
2005120111154-1212 
2005120611608-1632 
2005120811626-1627 
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Accuracy of Predicted Post- 
Maneuver Best Estimated 
Trajectory (Krn) 
17 ~ h ?  
Accuracy of Post-Maneuver 
Short-Arc Solution (Km) 
n n?7 
17.569 
34.678 
46.709 
38.257 
NA 
0.147 
0.401 
0.033 
0.356 
0.113 
XV COLA - Collision Avoidance 
The NASA policy NPD 8710.3b "NASA Policy for Limiting Orbital Debris Generation" states that the mission's 
progrdproject manager responsibilities include "Consulting with the Department of Defense's Cheyenne Mountain 
Operations Center prior to significant spacecraft operational or end-of mission maneuvers", defined as those 
resulting in a change of spacecraft altitude of lkrn or larger. 
The UARS support teams had experience with performing collision avoidance (COLA) analysis under 
circumstances in which multiple maneuvers were planned and executed within a fairly short timeframe from the 
ERBS EOL support. There was the complication that the ERBS and EO-1 maneuvers and collision avoidance 
analyses were also underway. After several iterations, the team settled on the following: 
a. Ephemeris files contain only the next bum (i.e. one bum at a time) 
b. Ephemeris files are 7-days in duration 
c. Nominal plan: Screen burnlno-bum cases at day Burn-2, Burn-1, Burn+l (updated no-burn only) 
1. Not possible for UARS bums separated by only one day 
2. Screen at Burn-1 if the Burn-2 screening contains a conjunctor of concern 
d. Criteria for additional analysis/discussion: Total miss distance less than 4km 
e. Burn/No-Bum ephemeredes from the FDF are delivered prior to 12 EST; the results are delivered by 6PM 
For UARS, the FDF generated the burn and no-bum ephemeredes and USSTRATCOM performed the collision 
avoidance analysis and distributed the results. The decisions on the advisability of additional maneuvers were made 
by the Debris Avoidance Working Group with input from USSTRATCOM. Due to the complicated situation, the 
FOT prepared a detailed schedule, updated frequently, which was followed by all parties. 
The FDF provided 52 files for COLA analysis between 9/17/2005 and 12/09/2005. These Files provided the basis 
of the Conjunction assessment screenings. The CA Summary provided the closest distance of the closest approach 
found with that prediction for each ephemeris provided. The potential for close approach to the International Space 
Station (ISS) was also of interest and noted separately.. Ironically the first Close approach was from the ERBS 
spacecraft. 
The closest approach for the bum scenario in the Oct 10 analysis was a less than 2km approach with object 3599, 
COSMOS 249 debris. The time of closest approach was predicted to be Oct 16 09:08:46 UTC with a miss distance 
of 1873 meters of which 619 meters were in the radial direction. The closest approach for the non-burn scenario was 
6.3km. The closest predicted approach between UARS and the ISS occurred with the bum scenario, where the 
predicted miss was 110 krn. 
The COLA conjunctions were with various debris objects, rocket bodies, and the following spacecraft: 
TRMM, SAMPEX, MONITOR-E, KUPON, EKRAN 20, RADCAT, BIRD 2, WIRE, ERBS, SIMSAT 1, MTI, JB- 
3 A, JB-3 B, JB-3 C, IGS lA, ROSAT, OFEQ 5, DART, USA 55, QUICKBIRD 2, GRACE 2, EXPLORER 21, 
METEOR PRTRODA, ROCSAT 1, ASTRO E2, HESSI, ASTERIX, NAGION 2, NMONITOR-E, SAMPEX, ETS 
7. Also, the following COSMOS were identified: 1732, 1271, 1544, 1378, 1805, 1726, 1707, 1500, 1574,405, 1733, 
1505, 1939,1842,1436,1633,1666,1743,1408,1222,1626,1825,803, and 240. By far the bulk of the 
conjunction approaches identified were with debris and rocket bodies. 
XVI Attitude Group 
The onboard Attitude Determination & Control Subsystem (AD&CS) performed well during the bums, maintaining 
attitude and body rates to within acceptable limits. One apparent exception to this was the second Test/Calibration 
bum -nominally a 30-second bum - that apparently terminated afier 13 seconds. The translation thruster stopped 
firing due to attitude disturbance at 13 seconds, and by the time the attitude rates had dropped below the threshold 
for the burn to resume, the total duration of the bum had elapsed, so that no further thrusting occurred. Later, longer 
burns indicated that translation thrusting typically resumed approximately 35 seconds after initial burn start. The 
second Earth Sensor Assembly (ESA2) was turned on prior to each burn, but was used in FD primarily to indicate 
changes in spacecraft roll and pitch. Data quality or ground data processing issues made the use of ESA2 data in 
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ground attitude solutions a detriment to solution accuracy, possibly since the spacecraft altitude during End-of- 
Mission was below the range originally planned for during Earth sensor assembly and mounting. Accurate ground 
attitude determination was only possible during periods of valid Digital Sun Sensor (DSS) data, which occurred at 
intervals predicted in FD by the Guide Star Occultation (GSOC) utility. (The deorbit maneuvers did not necessarily 
occur during intervals of valid DSS data.) Outside of these intervals, ground attitude determination could only make 
use of Three-Axis Magnetometer (TAM) data, which did not produce very accurate attitude solutions, as expected. 
Inertial reference unit (IRU, or "gyro") data were available and of good quality throughout the End-of-Mission span, 
allowing the accurate propagation of attitude solutions andlor attitude sensor measurements to other time points. 
Given these considerations and caveats, the most useful data available for presentation are the gyro data and the 
onboard attitude as determined by the UARS AD&CS. 
XVII. Lessons Learned 
A. FOT Personnel 
The declining health of the spacecrafts and the constant budget cuts drove the more experienced analysts and 
engineers away when that experience was needed the most. This was a concern when it came time to perform the 
more complex end of life operations 
Though UARS has been operational for fourteen years there were still members of the team who supported launch. 
This level of system knowledge is increasingly rare in the age of lean fast operations teams. Comparing the UARS 
to the ERBS EOM activities the benefit of the mission experienced team is undeniable when it came time to perform 
the more complex end of life operations. 
With ERBS staffing became an issue towards the end of the mission. Until 2002, there were two dedicated Offline 
engineers, one mission planner, and eight console analysts (two analysts per shift). With the normal streamlining of 
operations, when the end of life operations began, there was only one day engineerlmission planner, and four 
console operators; this put a very big strain on the flight operations team. The sole day engineer was responsible for 
implementing the end of life activities, scheduling the TDRSS/DSN supports required, building the block and 
normal command memory sequences required, and ensuring that they were executed correctly. All of this was done 
while performing the normal day to day operations of the spacecraft. 
Due to attrition, the expertise of the ERBS flight operations team was elsewhere. Two of the console operators were 
brand new to flight operations, and still learning their jobs at the start of the end of life operations. The other two 
operators had never been involved in these types of complex operations without a day engineer's supervision. To 
remedy this the Console operators were doubled up (two operators per twelve hour shift) with the newer operators 
on day shift with the day engineer. The operators were able to help each other in areas they were not familiar with 
but doubling them up caused them to work longer shifts. The flight operations team performed their jobs well but it 
could have been done more efficiently with a full team. 
B. NASAIBall Aerospace Engineers 
The end of life operations could not have been performed without the NASA Institutional engineering support 
through the AETD. The two Ball ERBS engineers (one of which had been with ERBS since its beginning) knew 
the spacecraft's propulsion and attitude systems thoroughly and had been supporting the monthly ERBS yaw 
maneuvers for years. They also had the benefit of being able to confer with other ERBS subsystem engineers 
(Command and Data Handling, Electrical Power) still working for Ball Aerospace. The two AETD engineers 
supporting the end of life operations had been supporting it for years and knew their subsystem thoroughly as well. 
The Attitude engineer had been working ERBS since the beginning and had a very good working relationship with 
the Ball engineers. The Power engineer had been working with the degraded power subsystem for years and knew 
exactly how to maintain it during the extended thruster burns. 
For UARS The ESMO System Engineering Support was vital to the Maneuver operations. The ESMOFSWM 
support had developed and implemented the 4 Thruster Mode Patch. They had the spacecraft's propulsion and 
attitude systems and had been supporting UARS for years. The FSW and Simulator Engineers allowed the 
Engineering team to pursue improvement and verify maneuvers operations, which reduced the complexity and 
duration of the EOM operations. 
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C. ERBS Ground System 
Since the mission lasted twenty-one years, a grodnd system upgrade was required. The original system was a main 
frame (PDP 1170) that was phased out in favor of a PC based ground system (Eclipse). The new system performed 
very well, but due to lack of finding, the known discrepancies with the system were never fixed. This became very 
evident during the end of life activities. The biggest problem was building the special block memory loads required 
for the very long fuel depletion thruster bums. The new ground system would not accept the block command loads 
generated by the in-house command management system. The Eclipse developer, created a work around for the 
problem that worked well, but the work around added to the already labor intensive task. Also, contingency 
command procedures, imported from the old ground system, would not work which led to manual intervention 
during very time limited operations. 
D. UARS Ground System 
Since the mission lasted fourteen years, a ground system upgrade was required. The original system was a main 
frame (PDP 1170) that was phased out in favor of a PC based ground system (Eclipse). The new system performed 
very well, but due to lack of funding, the known discrepancies with the system were never fixed. This became very 
evident during the end of life activities. The biggest problem was using the Real-Time plots during the calibration 
burns. The new ground system would incorrect plot time critical telemetry points. These incorrect plots caused the 
engineering team much consternation when they were trying to characterize the four-thruster mode patch. The 
Eclipse developer was aware of this problem which had been shelved at the end of the system development without 
further efforts. 
E. ERBS Spacecraft Documentation 
The ERBS flight operation team was blessed with very good spacecraft documentation. The original documentation 
developed before launch was still being used by the flight operations team at the end. It gave a very thorough 
rundown of the spacecraft's subsystems and instruments, as well as, a listing of the all the ERBS commands and 
telemetry. 
The ERBS flight operations team kept very detailed records of the normal and special operations performed. There 
were files for each of the monthly yaw maneuvers performed, as well as, the Delta V and instrument calibrations 
maneuvers performed in 2002. 
All of the spacecraft subsystem and instrument anomalies/failures were well documented. The documentation 
included any work around required for each case. 
Ground System Documentation 
The Eclipse system was documented very well. However, the support equipment was not due to the multiple 
transitions of contractor personnel through the life of the mission. There was no documentation on the Telemetry 
and Command front end computer, particularly on how to change and troubleshoot the desktops for different 
supports. Also, there was no documentation on the offline Trending system, particularly on how to manipulate data 
files. The knowledge for both of these systems was lost through attrition and never documented. 
Standard Operations Procedures 
The flight operations team developed standard operations procedures for the normal and special operations that 
needed to be performed. The day to day operations were described very well and any new person could perform 
them with limited help. However, some of the contingency operations procedures were either not complete or the 
contingency was not addressed at all. This became a problem during the end of life operations where out of the 
norm operations were necessary during decommissioning. For instance, the block command loads were not 
addressed at all and the instrument block loads were not described anywhere in the documentation.. 
F. UARS Spacecraft Documentation 
The UARS flight operation team was blessed with very good spacecraft documentation. The original documentation 
developed before launch was still being used by the flight operations team at the end. It gave a very thorough 
rundown of the spacecraft's subsystems and instruments, as well as, a listing of the all the UARS commands and 
telemetry. In this electronic age it would have made thing much easier if these documents were stored in an 
electronic format. Much time was wasted, paging through hardcopies looking for data.. 
3 4 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
Ground System Documentation 
The Eclipse system was documented very well. However, the support equipment was not. The benefit of the 
CDHF Trending system and operators was immeasurable. They allowed rapid turn around of the high-rate data 
which allow the engineers to quickly assess the spacecraft performance during the EOM activities. Their 
knowledge, particularly on how to manipulate data files, greatly reduced the turnaround time on maneuver 
assessment. Their contribution allowed the UARS Engineering Team to work around the Eclipse real-time plot 
discrepancy. 
G. FD Lessons Learned 
1. Lack of automation dramatically reduced the efficiency of the hnctions necessary for EOM support. 
2.  Lack of maneuver databases made it difficult to accurately assess historical propellant usage. 
3. Have as much information as possible in electronic form so that finding information is easier: e.g., all the old 
documents that we had to go through in order to pull out data. It would be less time consuming if we could just 
do a search on - fuel - and all the pertinent documents and pages come up. UARS does pre-date all desktop 
publishing software, but scanning and imaging of old documents into electronic form would have been quite 
useful. 
4. Make sure everyone is cross-trained and proficient on all software used prior to maneuvers. 
5 .  Mixing of SI and English units in output and input was and is dangerous and has caused problems for maneuver 
group. 
6 .  Have hardcopy/softcopy documents located in one central and organized area for the missions. Everyone has 
documents that pertain to all missions at their desks, in filing cabinets in their offices, and in the ops room. This 
makes it difficult and time consuming to find documents that pertain to a subject.. 
7. Recommend that future decommissioning efforts not be performed during the same time period if at all 
possible. UARS and ERBS caused a great deal of confusion by all parties. In some areas, the same personnel 
worked the same missions, therefore work load reduced quality checking and attending meetings. Many of the 
mission meetings were scheduled on the same day as the maneuvers. 
8. Recommend Project schedule more TDRS coherent tracking data events immediately following the maneuvers. 
A number of non-coherent passes were scheduled after the maneuver instead. This increased the waiting period 
to determine an orbit solution before the Network could obtain the success of the maneuver. 
9. The exercise of generating and evaluating the UARS ephemeredes for potential collisions was useful in that it 
was a good test of our ability to generate these ephemeredes repeatedly. 
10. The policy of only predicting through one maneuver even when multiple ones were planned was a good one for 
this circumstance. It was difficult to generate precise predictions for the UARS maneuvers. Post-maneuver 
predictions made before the maneuver did not provide good indicators of conjunction possibilities. Adding a 
second maneuver to the prediction would have been burdensome, since the possibility of performing the first 
maneuver but not the second would also need to be included, without generating much benefit. 
11. Designate a single point of contact for each organization involved (e.g., FD or FOT) to disseminate needed 
information to members of each organization, and to act as a clearinghouse for information going out of the 
organization. (But not for actual products being provided, only for communication.) 
12. Provide a list of loop-designations for various organizations. 
13. Report potential problems outside of the organization only after internal consensus has been reached on whether 
or not a problem exists, and after some concrete information on the problem has been obtained. 
14. Generate staffing schedules for various support elements and maintain them in a common location. 
15. Provide basic training to personnel in various support elements regarding procedures, products, and duties to be 
provided or performed during EOM support. 
16. All mail messages concerning EOM for a particular satellite should contain the spacecraft name in the 'subject' 
area. We received many messages regarding both UARS and ERBS plus our normal messages and it was 
difficult at times to determine which spacecraft a particular e-mail concerned. 
17. Given adequate lead-up time and resources, previously operational software and procedures could have been 
adapted to better support EOM activities. What was needed during normal operations support is not the same as 
what was required during EOM. 
18. Keep clear records for each day during important events so that we can recreate the effort at the end of the 
event. 
19. Lack of recent sensor calibration results decreased the accuracies of attitudes determined on the ground, 
particularly when TAM data alone were available for processing. In the case of UARS, IRU, DSS, and TAM 
should have all been calibrated as soon as the FHST's began to show evidence of degradation. 
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Suggested Improvements 
1. Agree to format of any special deliverables prior to proceeding with maneuvers so that automation of such a 
product can be performed in a timely manner. This will reduce the number of errors due to manual inputs. 
2.  Create a database of all pertinent materials that may be asked of FDF personnel so that the information can be 
easily accessible. 
3. Use one system of measurement, either SI or CGS, so that mixing of units does not happen. All software used 
should conform to one system. 
4. Evaluate the use of newer software that provides better capabilities in terms of maneuver planning. 
5. Decommissioning activities for several satellites should be performed in series rather than parallel. The first 
mission should be done with all maneuvers prior to starting the next mission's maneuvers. This will provide 
personnel working on both missions to concentrate on one specific mission at a time. 
6. Avoid scheduling a meeting for one satellite on the same day as a maneuver for the other would not be a 
problem in this case. This will also solve the problem of receiving email messages without headers and having 
to decipher which mission it is associated with. 
7. Staffing schedules should be used and distributed to all personnel associated with the decommissioning 
activities. 
8. Electronic logs for each sectionltask should be maintained in case there are handovers between shifts and there 
are some non-nominal activities that off-shift personnel are not aware of. 
XVIII. Conclusion 
Performing End-of-Mission Operations is a unique Mission Phase and needs to be recognized as such. Earlier 
Satellites usually were just turned off or suffered mission ending failures. New spacecraft need to incorporate End of 
Mission Plans into the design of the spacecraft system. Larger LEO observatories such as GLAST, NPP and NPOES 
are designed with reentry plans for their vehicles. Smaller explorer programs have conformed to the NASA's 
Reentry and Orbital Debris Guidelines by limiting on-orbit life to less then 25 years. 
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